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Introduction 
Some Issues at a Glance 
In the piece of work that follows, I focus exclusively on personal autonomy in the 
sense of self-mastery. The autonomous person is one who has, in some sense or 
other, mastery over their desires.! Exactly what this sense is will be the subject of 
this thesis. 
With this in mind, I can state the central question of this work. It is: What 
relationship. would need to obtain between a person and their desires for that person to 
be autonomous? This can be put another way. The first part of the title of this work is 
a quotation from Harry Frankfurt's paper "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person".2 Taking what Frankfurt provides for us, the question we want can be put as 
follows: What is it to make- and act upon- a desire "more truly [one's] own"? 
This is the foremost problem that I mean to address in the present work as a whole. 
Here is the way the theme will develop. There are two conceptions, or models, 
of the idea of personal autonomy. Both concern the formation of desires. Yet each 
runs its own line about what it is to be autonomous with respect to one's desires, 
what it is to make one's desires more truly one's own. I introduce the first of these 
early on. And I hope to be on the way to providing the other conception before the 
1 I will often use the third person plural pronoun to refer to the person in order to avoid both the 
cumbersome "his or her" and the unsuitable "his" (or "her"). 
2 Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXVIII, No. I (1971), p. 13. 
3 
end of this work as a whole. I can say in advance that, when all the arguments are in, 
it is the latter model which comes out looking superior to the former. Or so I shall 
argue. 
In a little more detail, here is an outline of what is to come. In chapter 1, I 
survey some of the literature on my topic. The literature provides us with a way into a 
discussion about the flrst of our models of autonomy, what I call the hierarchy model, 
for this is the dominant model to be found there. Hierarchy autonomy is based on an 
account of persons in terms of an hierarchy of desires- first-order desires, second-
order desires and so on. We will see that Frankfun is the main player, setting the 
agenda for the other writers. In chapter 2, I go on to criticise the dominant model by 
raising three problems. In the discussion there, some attention is given to a retouching 
of the hierarchy model in the light of the notion of decisive commitment. However, 
the retouched version is shown to have shortcomings as well. In chapter 3, I discuss a 
revised hierarchy model. Although this revised account fares better than the original 
account in respect of our set of problems, it is still vulnerable to a challenge which I 
advance. 
In chapter 4, I attempt to deyelop an alternative. I label this the attunement 
model. In chapter 5, I compare and contrast it with the hierarchy model. It will be 
shown there that the sons of considerations which tell against the hierarchy model do 
not present a serious challenge to the attunement model. We will see, in addition, that 
the attunement model has advantages over the hierarchy model. Finally, in a shon 
conclusion, I sum up the findings from each of the previous chapters, and I bid 
farewell to the hierarchy model of autonomy. 
